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McCormick on Evidence and the Concept of
Hearsay: A Critical Analysis Followed by
Suggestions to Law Teachers
Roger C. Park*
Few modern one volume treatises are as widely used or as
influential as McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence.1
The book has been employed by teachers as a casebook substi-
tute in law school evidence courses,2 used by attorneys in the
practice of law, and cited extensively by the Advisory Commit-
tee on the Federal Rules of Evidence.3 McCormick deserves
the popularity that it has achieved as a teaching tool and a ref-
erence work. On most topics, the book's explanation of evi-
dence doctrine is clear and illuminating. Nonetheless, the
sections on hearsay are of mixed quality. Although the book's
treatment of exceptions to the hearsay rule is usually helpful,
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I wish to thank my col-
league Donald G. Marshall for his helpful comments on earlier versions of this
Article, while exonerating him of responsibility for its content.
1. McCORmICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. MCCORMICK is the third largest sell-
ing hornbook produced by the West Publishing Company. Telephone conversa-
tion with Roger Noreen, Manager, Law School Department, West Publishing
Company (January 17, 1981).
2. During the 1979-1980 academic year, teachers at over 30 law schools
adopted a problem booklet, K. BROUN & R. MEISENHOLDER, PROBLEMS IN Evi-
DENCE (1st ed. 1973), that required the use of McCormick as the accompanying
text. The publishers expect that the number of law schools using the booklet
will increase in the current academic year because a revised and expanded edi-
tion of the booklet, K. BROUN & R. MEISENHOLDER, PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE (2d
ed. 1980), is now available. Telephone conversation with Roger Noreen, spra
note 1. A useful self-instruction book, E. KIMBALL, PROGRAMMED MATERIALS ON
PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE (1978), is also keyed to McCormick.
3. The Advisory Committee's Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence in-
clude frequent references to the first edition of the treatise. See, e.g., Advisory
Comm. Note, FED. R. EvID. 801(c). For the most part, Dean McCormick's origi-
nal treatment of the concept of hearsay was left untouched by the revisors,
whose principal contribution was updating the footnotes by adding cases de-
cided after 1954. Compare C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§§ 223-229 (1st ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as FIRST EDITION] with McCORMICK,
s"upra note 1, §§ 244-250. The only change of importance was the one described
in text accompanying notes 76-78 infra. Minor changes are described in notes
8, 47, 68 & 116 infra.
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its discussion of the distinction between hearsay and nonhear-
say is flawed; often, it reflects the perplexities of hearsay
caselaw without clarifying them.
This Article discusses the theoretical difficulties with Mc-
Cormick's treatment of the concept of hearsay and suggests al-
ternative approaches. Part I analyzes the book's definition of
hearsay and criticizes its assertion that certain classes of utter-
ances are nonhearsay under that definition. Part I also dis-
cusses the use of subsidiary concepts such as "circumstantial
evidence" and "verbal acts" as a way of classifying these utter-
ances. Part II presents teaching suggestions for the many law
teachers who use McCormick as the principal text for their evi-
dence courses.
I.
Definitions of hearsay are commonly either assertion-ori-
ented or declarant-oriented. An assertion-oriented definition
focuses on whether an out-of-court assertion will be used to
prove the truth of what it asserts,4 while a declarant-oriented
definition focuses on whether the use of the utterance will re-
quire reliance on the credibility of the out-of-court declarant.5
The exposition of the concept of hearsay in McCormick
draws on both of these traditions. The book defines hearsay as
follows:
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence, of a state-
ment made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to
show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its
value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter.6
4. For examples of assertion-oriented definitions, see FED. R. EVID. 801(C);
6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1766, at 250 (rev. ed. J. Chadbourn 1970-1978); Whea-
ton, What is Hearsay?, 46 IOWA L. REV. 210, 210 (1961).
5. For examples of declarant-oriented definitions, see 2 JoNEs ON EVI-
DENCE § 8:1, at 159 (6th ed. S. Gard 1972); Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87
HAxv. L. REV. 957, 959 (1974). A modified declarant-oriented definition is of-
fered in R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 340-41
(1977), though the authors treat their definition as also being consistent with
the assertion-oriented definition. For a description of their definition, see note
65 infra.
6. McCoRmcK, supra note 1, § 246, at 584 (emphasis omitted). This defi-
nition is a verbatim repetition of the version contained in the original. See
FRST EDrrON, supra note 3, § 225, at 460. McCormick contains caveats about its
definition of hearsay, maintaining that the most that any definition can do is to
'furnish a helpful starting point for discussion of the problems, and a memory
aid in recalling some of the solutions. But if the definition is to remain brief
and understandable, it will necessarily distort some parts of the picture. Sim-
plification has a measure of falsification." MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 246, at
584; accord, FmIST EDrION, supra note 3, § 225, at 459-60. A footnote attached to
this passage suggests that the author believed that "[t]wo problems dealt with
[Vol. 65:423
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Although this definition is essentially assertion-oriented, the
final clause introduces a declarant-oriented aspect by stating
that when an utterance is offered for its truth, then it rests for
value on the declarant's credibility.V The text immediately fol-
lowing the definition goes further, and indicates that when an
assertion is not offered for its truth, then it does not depend for
value on the declarant's credibility.8 Taken together, these
in later discussion" were "left ambiguous" by the definition. One of these
problems was the hearsay status of nonverbal conduct; the other, whether dep-
ositions and former testimony should be admitted as hearsay or under a hear-
say exception. McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 246, at 584 n.47; FIRST EDITION,
supra note 3, § 225, at 460 n.2.
7. Like other treatments of hearsay, the discussion in McCormick states
that "credibility" refers not only to the declarant's sincerity, but also to his or
her powers of memory, perception, and narration. See McCoRmicK, supra note
1, § 246, at 585 (declarant's "credibility" refers to "his opportunity and capacity
to observe, his powers of memory, the accuracy of his reporting, and his ten-
dency to lie or tell the truth"); FIRST EDITION, supra note 3, § 225, at 460. See
also McCoRicK, supra note 1, § 245, at 581. The revisors inserted the curious
statement that
[t] he factors upon which the credibility of testimony depends are
perception, memory, and narration of the witness.... While some
writers add sincerity as a fourth factor, it seems rather to be only an
aspect of the three mentioned above. Regardless of whether the wit-
ness lies deliberately or makes an honest mistake, his credibility is im-
paired.
Id. The notion expressed here that there are only three elements of credibility
is ignored in subsequent discussion in favor of the more conventional view that
sincerity is a separate element. See, e.g., McCoRMICK, supra note 1, §§ 246, 249-
250, at 584, 585, 590 n.92, 596.
8. The definition, see text accompanying note 6 supra, merely says that
when a statement is offered to show its truth, then it rests for value on the de-
clarant's credibility. McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 246, at 584; FmrsT EDITION,
supra note 3, § 225, at 460. That definition does not expressly state that an ut-
terance not offered for its truth does not rest for value on credibility. This idea
is, however, expressed in the description of reasons why utterances that fall
outside the definition are not hearsay. The book notes that there is no need for
cross-examination under oath when use of an utterance does not require reli-
ance on the declarant's credibility, and concludes that "the suggested definition
... seeks to limit the term 'hearsay' to situations where the out-of-court asser-
tion is offered as equivalent to testimony to the facts so asserted by a witness
on the stand. Only then does the want of such safeguards as cross-examination
become material." McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 246, at 585; FIRST EDrrIoN, supra
note 3, § 225, at 460-61 (emphasis added). A similar suggestion that the declar-
ant's credibility is not an issue when the utterance is not offered for the truth
of the matter asserted is found in the introduction to the section on out-of-court
utterances that are not hearsay-
The hearsay rule forbids evidence of out-of-court assertions to
prove the facts asserted in then. Manifestly, proof of utterances and
writings may be made with an almost infinite variety of other purposes,
not resting for their value upon the veracity of the out-of-court declar-
ant and hence falling outside the hearsay classification.
McCORMIcK, supra note 1, § 249, at 588; accord, FIRST EDITION, supra note 3,
§ 228, at 463. The revisors added a footnote to the second edition acknowledg-
ing that utterances offered as circumstantial evidence of the declarant's state of
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passages in McCormick suggest that the assertion-oriented and
declarant-oriented definitions are functionally equivalent.
This suggestion is misleading, since choice of one definition
over the other can lead to different results.9 An utterance of-
fered as a falsehood provides the most vivid example. Suppose
that X is charged with committing a crime in Boston. The po-
lice talk to X's wife, who tells them that X was with her in Den-
ver on the day in question. The wife's statement is
demonstrably false, and the prosecution seeks to use it against
X for the inference that X's wife lied because she knew him to
be guilty. Under an assertion-oriented definition, the wife's
statement is not hearsay because it is not offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.'0 Under a declarant-oriented defi-
nition, however, the statement would be hearsay because the
trier's use of it requires reliance on the wife's powers of mem-
ory, perception, and narration."
mind are "admittedly... subject to all the hearsay dangers, except to the ex-
tent that deliberate falsification diminishes when a statement is not used to
prove anything asserted therein." McCoRMCK, supra note 1, § 249, at 590 n.92.
The revisors, however, did not incorporate this insight into the text or eradicate
inconsistent passages.
9. See Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Con-
cept, 62 HARv. L. REV. 177, 196-212 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Morgan, Hearsay
Dangers]. See also Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-45, 59 HARv. L. Rsv. 481,
544-45 (1946).
10. See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219-20 (1974); 6 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 4, § 1766, at 250. Appealing from an election fraud conviction, the
defendant in Anderson argued that the trial judge had erred in admitting testi-
mony about falsehoods uttered by his associate during a cover-up attempt. The
Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, stating that testimony about the ut-
terances
was not admitted into evidence ... to prove the truth of anything as-
serted therein. Quite the contrary, the point of the prosecutor's intro-
ducing those statements was simply to prove that the statements were
made so as to establish a foundation for later showing, through other
admissible evidence, that they were false.
417 U.S. at 219-20 (footnotes omitted). The Court expressly eschewed any reli-
ance on a theory that the utterances might be admissions of co-conspirators;
the conspiracy had ended by the time the utterances were made. Id. at 218-19.
The sole rationale for admission was that the utterances were not offered to
show the truth of the matters asserted therein.
11. The wife might not have intended a cover-up; she may simply have
been mistaken about the date of her husband's presence in Denver. Even if
she intended to mislead the police because she believed her husband was
guilty, her belief may have been based on a bare suspicion or an insane delu-
sion. Alternatively, she may have misspoken, saying "June first" when she
meant "July first." Thus, substantial reliance on her memory, perception, and
narrative ability are required in order to reach the final inference that her hus-
band is guilty. For examples of declarant-oriented definitions that would seem
to classify the wife's utterance as hearsay, see &. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG,
supra note 5, at 340-45; Tribe, supra note 5, at 959-60. See also Morgan, Hearsay
Dangers, supra note 9, at 218-19.
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McCormick itself deems certain utterances nonhearsay
even though they depend for value upon the declarant's credi-
bility. For example, the book states that the utterance "Harold
is the finest of my sons," offered to prove that the declarant was
fond of Harold, is nonhearsay because it is not offered to show
the truth of its assertion.12 Under a declarant-oriented defini-
tion, however, the utterance would be hearsay because it rests
on the declarant's sincerity and narrative ability.13
Perhaps careful readers will not be misled by the passages
in McCormick that suggest that declarant-oriented and asser-
tion-oriented definitions of hearsay lead to the same results.
Although the initial discussion in McCormick is likely to cause
readers to think that assertions not offered for their truth are
always free from credibility dangers, readers who carefully con-
sider the subsequent examples in McCormick should be able to
avoid this misconception.' 4
There is, however, a much more serious defect in the book.
McCormick often deems assertions nonhearsay even though
they are offered to show the truth of their assertions and they
rest on the declarant's credibility. For example, McCormick en-
dorses the view that the utterance "I believe that I am King
Henry the Eighth," offered to show the declarant's insanity, is
not hearsay because it is "verbal conduct offered circumstan-
tially."15 By calling it "conduct," McCormick insinuates that
the utterance is in some way similar to nonassertive conduct.
12. McCoRmAcK, supra note 1, § 249, at 590-91; FIRST EDITION, upra note 3,
§ 228, at 465-66. See also McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 249, at 591 n.94; FIPST EDI-
TION, supra note 3, § 228, at 466 n.15.
13. The utterance rests on the declarant's narrative ability because it loses
value if the declarant meant to say "Arnold is the finest of my sons" or "Harold'
is the first of my sons." It rests on the declarant's sincerity because a deliberate
lie about Harold's character, for example to his prospective employer, would
undercut the inference that the declarant was especially fond of Harold. An-
other hearsay danger, ambiguity of inference, is also present because the de-
clarant might genuinely believe that Harold is the finest, but might
nevertheless be more fond of his youngest son Joe. On the hearsay danger of
ambiguity of inference, see Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criti-
cisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV. 682, 686-91, 695-98
(1962). For an example of a declarant-oriented definition under which "Harold
is the finest of my sons" would be hearsay, see Tribe, supra note 5, at 958-61.
Lempert and Saltzburg, who advocate a modified declarant-oriented definition,
might reach a different result. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 5, at
340-41 (utterances are hearsay when they rest on memory and perception of de-
clarant, but not when they rest only on sincerity and narration).
14. See examples in McComcx, supra note 1, § 249, at 590-94. See also id.
at 590 n. 92.
15. McCo&mc, supra note 1, § 249, at 593; FIRST EDITION, supra note 3,
§ 228, at 467-68.
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This particular "verbal conduct," however, manifests an intent
both to comunicate an idea and to affirm a proposition that
could be false, hence it is assertive.16 The further statement in
the book that the utterance is offered "circumstantially" is
tantalyzing but not helpful. If the definition of "circumstantial
evidence" set forth earlier in McCormick is applied, then to say
that an utterance is "offered circumstantially" is merely an-
other way of saying that it is not being offered to show the
truth of what it asserts. 7
If the reader succeeds in penetrating the language of the
book to the point of understanding that "verbal conduct offered
circumstantially" is a variety of "statement not offered for the
truth of its assertion," he or she may decide that the utterance
is not offered for its truth because it is offered to show that the
16. McCormick never specifically defines the term "assertion", but the
book's discussion of the difference between assertive and nonassertive conduct
indicates that conduct is considered assertive when it is "an effort at expres-
sion." See McCoRamKc, supra note 1, § 250, at 596; FIRST EDITION, supra note 3,
§ 228, at 471; cf. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, supra note 9, at 216 "assertion gener-
ally is taken" to include words and nonverbal conduct offered on the assump-
tion that the declarant intended them as a communication or expression). See
also UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 62(1), 63. Hearsay scholars sometimes use
"assertion" as if identical in meaning to "statement offered for its truth"; when
these scholars say that an utterance is not "assertive" they mean that it is not
offered for the truth of the matter stated. See 3A J. WiGMORE, supra note 4,
§ 1018, at 996. Finally, legally operative language is sometimes said to be
"nonassertive." Cf. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1772, at 267 (words that are a
"verbal part of an act" are "not offered as assertions").
17. The discussion in McCormick states:
The characterization of evidence as 'direct' or 'circumstantial'
points to the kind of inference which is sought to be drawn from the
evidence to the truth of the proposition for which it is offered. If a wit-
ness testifies that he saw A stab B with a knife, and this testimony is
offered to prove the stabbing, the inference sought is merely from the
fact that the witness made the statement, and the assumption that wit-
nesses are worthy of belief, to the truth of the asserted fact. This is di-
rect evidence. When, however, the evidence is offered also for some
further proposition based upon some inference other than merely the
inference from assertion to the truth of the fact asserted, then the evi-
dence is circumstantial evidence of this further fact-to-be-inferred.
McCoRmIcK, supra note 1, § 185, at 435; FIRST EDITION, supra note 3, § 152, at 316
(footnotes omitted). Applying these definitions, the utterance "I believe I am
King Henry the Eighth" would be direct evidence that the declarant believed
he was King Henry the Eighth and circumstantial evidence that he was insane.
If the direct inference that the speaker believed himself to be Henry the Eighth
is a necessary step toward reaching the circumstantial inference that the
speaker was insane, then the circumstantial nature of the second inference
does not save the utterance from being classified as hearsay. See note 21 infra
and accompanying text. The distinction between circumstantial and direct evi-
dence employed in McCormick is the standard one found in works on evidence.
See 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 25 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WiGMORE,
1940 EDITION].
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declarant was insane, rather than that the declarant believed
he was Henry the Eighth. This theory must be rejected. As Mc-
Cormick elsewhere recognizes, an assertion is hearsay if the
trier's first inference' 8 runs from the assertion to the proposi-
tion asserted, even if the proponent's ultimate purpose is to es-
tablish a different proposition.19 Otherwise, the assertion "I
saw Smith running from the bank" would not be hearsay if the
proponent's ultimate purpose was to prove that Smith robbed
the bank.
The question whether "I believe that I am King Henry the
Eighth" is hearsay, therefore, turns on whether the trier can
use the utterance without, as a first step, inferring that the de-
clarant believed he was King Henry the Eighth. In certain unu-
sual situations, the trier might be able to skip this step. For
example, if the only words the declarant ever uttered from
birth to death were "I believe that I am King Henry the
Eighth," then the trier might infer insanity indirectly. The clas-
sification of the utterance as nonhearsay in McCormick, how-
ever, is categorical-it applies to utterances by declarants
whose past behavior has been comparatively commonplace, in-
cluding declarants with a motive for feigning insanity.2 0
Classification of "I believe I am King Henry the Eighth" as
hearsay would have no effect on its admissibility because, if
hearsay, the utterance would be admissible under the excep-
18. Careful verbalists might prefer to call an inference from an assertion to
the proposition asserted a second or third inference, on grounds that the trier's
preliminary inferences would be that the declarant meant what he said and
that he believed what he meant. However, McCormick treats the proposition
asserted as the first inference, see note 19 infra, and this usage has been fol-
lowed here.
19. The book's discussion of this matter reads as follows:
The requirement in the definition of hearsay is that the statement
be offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. What if the imme-
diate purpose is to prove the fact asserted but the ultimate purpose is
to draw a circumstantial inference of another fact, not asserted in the
statement? Suppose the witness reports that D told him, a week before
D's body was found in the bay, that he was planning to go fishing the
next day with X in the latter's boat. If offered to show D's intent it is
plainly hearsay, and it is no less subject to the hearsay weaknesses
simply because a further inference, i.e., that D did go fishing with X, is
to be built upon the matter asserted, i.e., D's intent. Accordingly we
find the courts treating the statement as hearsay whenever the first
purpose is to prove the fact asserted in it, even though other secondary
inferences are sought to be built upon the first.
McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 246, at 586 (emphasis in original); accord, FIRST
EDITION, supra note 3, § 225, at 461.
20. For example, under McCormick's analysis, the utterance would still be
nonhearsay even if made by a declarant after raising the insanity defense to a
charge of murder.
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tion for declarations of present state of mind.2 1 Therefore, the
only justification for discussing whether it is hearsay or not is
to illustrate the distinction between utterances used circum-
stantially and those used directly, so that readers will be able
to apply that distinction when admissibility actually turns on it.
Sometimes the distinction does make a difference. When an ut-
terance manifesting the declarant's state of mind is used for an
inference about a past event, the state of mind exception does
not apply and the utterance might be excluded unless it could
be classified as circumstantial evidence.2 2 For example,, if the
prosecution offers "I was entering the bank when I saw X run
out" to support the inference that X robbed the bank, the utter-
ance would be hearsay that is not admissible under the stan-
dard exception. By suspending common sense and reasoning
by analogy to the McCormick example of the "circumstantial"
use of "I believe I am Henry the Eighth," however, a reader
could create a theory under which "I saw X run out" is also
"circumstantial" evidence and hence not hearsay.23 Thus the
21. The utterance would clearly be admissible in jurisdictions following
the state of mind exception of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID.
803(3). However, if the utterance was made under circumstances indicating a
motive to fabricate or was lacking in "spontaniety," some common law jurisdic-
tions might still refuse to admit it. McCoP.iC, supra note 1, § 294, at 695 &
n.56.
22. See McCoRMcic, supra note 1, § 296, at 701-04, FirsT EDrrION, supra
note 3, § 271, at 576-78. Under the federal state of mind exception, however, cer-
tain statements about wills may be used for inferences about past events. Rule
803(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides an exception that admits
[a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion,
sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design,
mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement
of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it
relates to the execution, revocation, indentification, or terms of declar-
ant's will.
This broadening of the exception had precursors at common law. See McCoR-
MICK, supra note 1, § 296, at 702-03; FIRST EDrrIoN, supra note 3, § 271, at 577-78.
The state of mind exception can also be employed to admit utterances used for
inferences about past events if the use of the utterance does not involve reli-
ance on the declarant's memory. For example, if the declarant said that he or
she hated Harold, the utterance can be used as evidence that the declarant did
not intend that money transferred to Harold two weeks earlier be a gift. The
trier would be permitted to infer that the state of mind of hatred was continu-
ous in time, and thus to make inferences about previous events on the basis of
later states of mind. See McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 294, at 695-96; FIRST EDI-
TION, supra note 3, § 269, at 569-70.
23. There are a number of spurious circumstantial evidence theories that
are no more far-fetched than the treatment of "I believe I am Henry VIII" in
McCormick. First, it might be argued that the testimony is not offered for the
truth of its assertion because it is offered for the inference that X robbed the
bank, not merely to show that X was running out of the bank. Cf. McCoRMcK,
supra note 1, § 293, at 692; FIRST EDITION, supra note 3, § 267, at 565-66 (patient's
[Vol. 65:423
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Henry the Eighth example in McCormick teaches the reader
how to change hearsay into nonhearsay simply by calling it
"circumstantial evidence," a lesson that courts have often
heeded.24
Another example of the misleading use of the term "cir-
cumstantial" in McCormick appears in the analysis of a dece-
dent's assertion that he made a will.25 McCormick notes that
some courts have created a special hearsay exception for retro-
spective declarations by testators when used to prove that the
testators have made wills, while others have admitted such ut-
terances under the exception for declarations of state of
mind.26 The book then states, without any sign of disapproval,
that "[i] n the alternative, the declarations may be regarded not
as statements offered to prove the truth of assertions contained
therein, but as conduct circumstantially evincing a belief and
thus not falling within a restrictive definition of hearsay."2 7
This passage means that the decedent's assertion "I made a
will" can be regarded as nonhearsay because the trier can use
an indirect or "circumstantial" chain of inferences, inferring
first that the decedent believed his or her utterance, and sec-
ond that the belief was accurate.28
statement of medical history to physician deemed hearsay when offered to
prove truth of patient's statement but nonhearsay when offered to support in-
ferences that physician drew from patient's statement). But see McCoRaIcK,
supra note 1, § 247, at 586; FIRST EDrrION, supra note 3, § 226, at 461. Second, it
might be argued that the testimony is not offered to show that X was in fact
running out of the bank, but only to show that X was in the presence of the
testifying witness at the time and place in question. Cf. Bridges v. State, 247
Wis. 350, 19 N.W.2d 529 (1945) (child's assertion that she had been in apartment
with certain features was "circumstantial" evidence that she had been there;
assertion deemed not offered for truth because not offered to show that apart-
ment had those features). Finally, it might be argued that the evidence is of-
fered as circumstantial evidence that the witness believed he saw X running
out of the bank, as the basis for a further "circumstantial" inference that X was
in fact running out of the bank. See McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 296, at 702-03;
FIRST EDrrION, supra note 3, § 271, at 577-78.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 532 F.2d 641, 645-46 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976); United States v. Snow, 517 F.2d 441, 443-44 (9th Cir.
1975); United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 596 (2d Cir. 1973), cert denied, 417
U.S. 936 (1974); Bridges v. State, 247 Wis. 350, 364-65, 19 N.W.2d 529, 535 (1945).
25. McCoRIdic, supra note 1, § 296, at 702-03; FRST EDITION, supra note 3,
§ 271, at 577-78.
26. Id. at 702; FIRST EDION at 577-78.
27. Id. at 703; accord, FIRST EDITrON at 578.
28. My conclusion that Dean McCormick had this double inference in
mind is a guess, but not a fanciful one. Wigmore discussed the same example
at great length, see 2 WiGMoRE, 1940 EDIION, supra note 17, § 267, and Dean
McCormick in all likelihood knew about Wignore's analysis. After spelling out
a "circumstantial" chain of inferences from the declarant's assertion to his be-
lief and back to the existence of the fact asserted, Wigmore pronounced that
1981]
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Acceptance of the theory that the decedent's assertion
about his or her will is not hearsay requires leaping two formi-
dable conceptual hurdles. First, it requires acceptance of the
notion that "I wrote a will" is not the equivalent of "I believe I
wrote a will," so that asserting the former does not assert the
truth of the latter. This idea has found support in both caselaw
and scholarly writing, but reasoned justification for it is en-
tirely lacking.2 9 Second, the theory involves acceptance of what
might be called the doctrine of the curative initial inference,
under which an utterance is not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted if the first inference in the line of proof is not
the fact asserted, even though the final infererice is that the
fact asserted is true.30 Although the doctrine of curative initial
inference has respectable lineage in a limited set of situa-
tions,3 1 categorical acceptance of such a theory would severely
"in theory at least" this "pretended double inference" provided a legitimate ar-
gument that the utterance was not hearsay. Id. at 93. See also Seligman, An
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 HARv. L. Rmv. 146, 153-58 (1912).
29. For authorities on both sides, see 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1766, at
250 n.1. The notion lacks justification because none of the policies behind the
hearsay rule support different treatment of the two types of utterances.
30. Although there is no express reference in McCormick to what this Arti-
cle has called the "curative initial inference," the book does state that courts
treat a statement as hearsay "wherever the first purpose is to prove the fact
asserted in it.. . ." McCoimncy, supra note 1, § 246, at 586 (emphasis in origi-
nal). This passage could be read negatively to mean that a statement is not
hearsay if the "first purpose" is to prove something other than the fact asserted
therein, even if the ultimate purpose is to prove that fact.
31. The notion that a circumstantial initial inference can save an assertion
from being classified as hearsay is implict in well-established doctrine. For ex-
ample, suppose that proponent offers a prior consistent statement of his or her
witness to rebut a charge of recent fabrication. Under traditional theory, the
prior statement is deemed nonhearsay when it is offered merely to bolster the
witness's in-court credibility, and not to show the truth of assertions contained
therein. See, e.g., Pine v. Vigil, 28 Colo. App. 601, 609, 480 P.2d 868, 871 (1970); 4
J. WiGMORE, supra note 4, § 1332. The need for the doctrine of the curative ini-
tial inference can be illustrated by positing a case in which one of the issues is
whether a traffic light was red. Plaintiff produces a witness whose only role is
to testify "the light was red." Defendant impeaches the witness by showing
that after the accident the witness was hired by plaintiff, and hence is biased.
Plaintiff would then be permitted to enter the prior statement of the witness at
the scene of the accident that "the light was red." Under conventional doctrine,
the utterance at the scene is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted,
but only to show that the witness was credible despite the subsequent em-
ployer-employee relationship. The utterance at the scene is, however, being of-
fered to show, sooner or later in the chain of inferences, exactly what it says,
i.e., "the light was red." The inference of witness-reliability is the initial infer-
ence that is deemed to save the utterance from being offered for the truth of
the matter asserted. A similar preliminary inference saves prior inconsistent
statements from being classified as hearsay; such statements too often state ex-
actly what the proponent seeks to prove to prevail on his overall claim. The
Federal Rules of Evidence place some prior statements of witnesses into a spe-
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reduce the exclusionary power of the hearsay rule.
Acceptance of this reasoning in McCormick leads to a view
that in effect abolishes the hearsay rule. Wigmore, who was
tempted to use the curative initial inference doctrine as a way
of dealing with retrospective declarations about wills, did tell
his readers that this approach could lead to evasion of the hear-
say rule.32 The McCormick treatise does not offer any caveats
of this nature. It leaves open, at least in theory, the argument
that the declarant's utterance "Defendant killed Jones" is
nonhearsay because it is offered to prove the declarant's belief
"circumstantially" en route to the final inference that the de-
fendant killed Jones.
McCormick also uses the password "circumstantial" to
avoid a serious hearsay problem with respect to negative re-
sults of inquiries. The book correctly states that testimony
about fruitless inquiries is nonhearsay when the issue is
whether a diligent search was made to locate a missing person.
It goes on to assert that such testimony is nonhearsay even
when offered to show the nonexistence of the person inquired
about. An escape from hearsay "is furnished by the theory that
fruitless inquiries are evidence of inability of the inquirer to
find [the person] after diligent search and this in turn is cir-
cumstantial evidence of the nonexistence or nonresidence of
the person in question."33
Under this theory, testimony that townspeople said they
had not seen X is nonhearsay when offered to show that X was
no longer a resident of the community.34 Classification of these
cial new category of nonhearsay, see FED. R. EvD. 801(d) (1); however, because
of limits on the new category, others must find their way into evidence under
the traditional theory that they are not offered for the truth of the matter as-
serted.
There are other examples of use of the doctrine of curative initial inference
to avoid hearsay classification. For example, a number of courts have evaded
the hearsay rule by finding an "indirect" inference from an utterance to a de-
clarant's belief in the utterance and then back to the proposition asserted in
the utterance. See, e.g., the cases described in 2 WiGMORE, 1940 EDITION, supra
note 17, §§ 267-272.
32. See 2 WIGMORE, 1940 EDION, supra note 17, § 267, at 92-93. For a simi-
lar view, see Seligman, supra note 28, at 151-52.
33. McCoRMicK, supra note 1, § 249, at 594; accord, FIRST EDITION, supra
note 3, § 228, at 469.
34. Here, classification of the utterances as hearsay could make a differ-
ence because the testimony does not fit easily under any of the standard excep-
tions. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the proponent could seek to have
the testimony admitted under the residual exceptions established by Rules
803(24) and 804(b) (5). These identically worded sections provide a hearsay ex-
ception for any
statement not specifically covered by any of the foregong exceptions
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fruitless inquiries as nonhearsay is inconsistent with both as-
sertion-oriented and declarant-oriented definitions of hearsay.
The responses of the townspeople are hearsay under an asser-
tion-oriented definition because the inference that the declar-
ants had not seen the missing person is an indispensable link
in the trier's chain of inferences. Maintaining, as McCormick
does, that the responses "are evidence of inability of the in-
quirer to find [the person] after diligent search" 35 is merely an
abstract way of saying that the searcher heard assertions from
numerous declarants. Unless one accepts the kind of reasoning
used by McCormick in dealing with retrospective utterances
about wills,36 one must conclude that the declarants' utterances
are being used directly to show the truth of the matters as-
serted therein. The susceptibility of the searcher's testimony
to characterization as evidence of "diligent search" does not
save the testimony from classification as hearsay. If the McCor-
mick analysis is followed to its logical end, then testimony that
townspeople said they saw Y rob a bank is circumstantial evi-
dence that Y robbed it and hence not hearsay. Any proposition
asserted by numerous declarants in response to questioning
leads to the inference that a diligent search occurred, and thus
it is always possible to posit a curative initial inference in such
cases. The curative initial inference 37 theory proves too much
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission
of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be ad-
mitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to
the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to pro-
vide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.
FED. R. EvD. 803(24), 804(b) (5). See generally Yasser, Strangulating Hearsay:
The Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 11 TEx. TEmc L" REV. 587 (1980).
Note, however, that if the notice requirements of the residual exceptions are
read literally, they would be inapplicable in cases in which the proponent ne-
glected to give notice before trial of intent to offer the testimony about fruitless
inquiries. If the residual exceptions are inapplicable, then the testimony would
appear not to fit under any of the other federal hearsay exceptions, unless it
could be recast in the form of reputation testimony and proffered under the
theory that it is "reputation concerning personal history" within the meaning of
FED. R. EvrD. 803(19).
35. McConMciK, supra note 1, § 249, at 594; FMST EDrITON, supra note 3,
§ 228, at 469.
36. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
37. For an explanation of the "curative initial inference," see text accompa-
nying notes 30-32 supra.
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in this instance.
Declarant-oriented definitions also fail to provide an escape
for testimony of fruitless inquiries. The trier of fact must
clearly rely on the declarants' credibility to reach the inference
that the missing person does not reside in the community.
Moreover, the trier's reliance cannot always be characterized as
de minimis. The degree to which the value of the testimony is
affected by reliance on credibility depends on the circum-
stances. The declarants' denials are likely to be reliable when
the searcher is a minister, but unreliable when the searcher is
a bill collector.
The best reason for admitting evidence of a fruitless search
is necessity. There is often no better way to prove nonresi-
dence. Necessity can be grounds for creating a new hearsay
exception or for invoking a residual exception,38 but necessity
has nothing to do with whether the trier's inference is direct or
indirect. Necessity, therefore, does not provide an analytically
sound basis for classifying an utterance as circumstantial evi-
dence.
The examples discussed so far have involved instances in
which McCormick evades a hearsay problem by labeling utter-
ances "circumstantial evidence." The following two examples
illustrate another escape from the hearsay rule. In these situa-
tions, McCormick rescues assertions that seem to be offered for
their truth by saying that they do not require reliance on the
declarant's veracity. The first example involves a declarant's
assertion that his brakes are defective. McCormick states that
this assertion is "evidence tending to show circumstantially" 3 9
that the operator knew that the brakes were bad. This is
merely an application of the theory that asserting a fact is true
is not the same as asserting that one believes it to be true.40
McCormick then addresses the situation in which the declarant
asserts the exact proposition to be proved:
Even [when] the statement is assertive as to the existence of knowl-
edge, "I know the brakes are bad," and is offered to show he did know
it, it can still rest on the nonhearsay ground that (bad brakes having
been otherwise shown) his remark tends to show that if the brakes
were bad he was aware of it. The existence of knowledge is apparent
38. See the necessity requirement in FED. R. EVID. 803(24)(B),
804(b) (5) (B).
39. McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 249, at 591; accord, FIRST EDrON, supra
note 3, § 228, at 466.
40. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
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without any reliance on his veracity. 4 1
If classified as hearsay, the utterance "I know the brakes
are bad" would still be admissible under the exception for dec-
larations of present state of mind.4 2 Usually the utterance
would also be admissible as a personal or vicarious admission
of a party-opponent. 43 Therefore, the point of using this exam-
ple must be to teach learners something about the concept of
hearsay, and not to show that this particular utterance is ad-
missible.
There is indeed a useful teaching point implicit in the
quoted passage. Even though an utterance may at first seem to
be hearsay under an assertion-oriented definition, it is not
hearsay if it satisifies the declarant-oriented definition. In
other words, even if the utterance asserts the exact proposition
to be proved, it is not hearsay if it does not rest for value on the
credibility of the declarant. Thus, "I am alive" is not hearsay
when offered to show that the declarant was alive.
The "I know the brakes are bad" example in McCormick is
flawed, however, because the usefulness of the utterance rests
to some degree on the declarant's credibility. First, it depends
for value on the assumption that the declarant is sincere. The
declarant might believe the brakes are good, but nonetheless
be lying about his belief-for example, he might be trying to
end a conversation with an obnoxious critic who asserted that
brakes on the kind of car the declarant owns are always bad.
Second, the utterance depends for value on the declarant's nar-
rative ability. The declarant may have intended to say "I know
the brakes aren't bad."
Admittedly, the trier will not be required to rely very much
on the declarant's veracity in the usual situation in which "I
know the brakes are bad" is offered. If, however, McCormick's
analysis of this example were applied to all utterances offered
to show a declarant's then-existing knowledge, there would be
situations in which the trier would need to rely heavily on the
declarant's credibility. Suppose, in an action alleging breach of
41. McCoRMcIc, supra note 1, § 249, at 592; FIRST EDrION, .supra note 3,
§ 228, at 466 (emphasis added on final sentence).
42. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
43. Normally the declarant would be a party and his declaration would be
offered to show that he had been negligent. If the declarant was not joined as a
party in a negligence action against his employer, the utterance would be a vi-
carious admission of the employer, see FED. R EvD. 801(d) (2) (D), but would
not be a vicarious admission in common law jurisdictions that require that the
employee be authorized to speak for his principal on the matter. See McCoR-
McK, supra note 1, § 267, at 640-41; FiRST EDITION, supra note 3, § 244, at 517-18.
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an employment contract, the defendant maintains that the
plaintiff was properly fired for cause because she operated the
defendant's nuclear reactor without knowing whether it was
safe to do so. The plaintiff offers in evidence her utterance,
made immediately prior to ordering that the reactor be acti-
vated, that she had checked each instrument and all readings
were normal. Even if the plaintiff offered other evidence estab-
lishing that the instrument readings were in fact normal, the
trier would still be required to rely on her credibility to reach
the conclusion that she knew the readings were in the range of
safety at the time of the utterance. Further, any assertion of
knowledge that comes in response to a question is suspect. A
student can correctly answer "true" on a true-false test without
knowing the proposition to be true. Credibility dangers are
even greater when the question suggests an answer. For exam-
ple, a foreman's answer to the question "Do you know that Joe
was late?" is subject to the danger that the foreman will falsely
assert knowledge because a foreman is expected to know
whether employees are on time.
Immediately after the discussion of "I know the brakes are
bad," McCormick turns to the hearsay problem in the cele-
brated case of Bridges v. State.44 The defendant in Bridges had
been convicted of taking indecent liberties with a seven-year-
old girl. The prosecution argued that the defendant lured the
girl into his apartment, molested her, and then allowed her to
walk home. Soon afterwards, the girl made statements to her
mother and to police describing the building and apartment in
which she had been molested. The police were not able to lo-
cate the apartment on the basis on her description, and did not
suspect that the defendant was the molester until he was ar-
rested a month later for another offense. 45 The trial judge ad-
mitted the girl's pretrial utterances about the apartment, and
the Wisconsin Supreme Court airmed, stating that the girl's
utterances were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted
(that the apartment had certain features), but only to show
"circumstantially" that the girl had been in the apartment.46
This theory is fallacious because the girl's assertion was that
she had been in an apartment that had certain features, and
her assertion was offered to show that she had in fact been in
an apartment with those features.
44. 247 Wis. 350, 19 N.W.2d 529 (1945), discussed in McCoRMIcK, supra note
1, § 249, at 592; FIRST EDITION, supra note 3, § 228, at 467.
45. 247 Wis. at 357, 19 N.W.2d at 532.
46. 247 Wis. at 364-66, 19 N.W.2d at 535-36.
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In its analysis of Bridges, McCormick does not endorse the
court's "circumstantial evidence" theory. Instead, the book em-
ploys the declarant-oriented aspect of its hearsay definition,
maintaining that the evidence was nonhearsay because the
girl's assertions "had value without regard to her veracity."4 7
Although this proposition is correct, it proves too much. Admit-
tedly, the girl's assertions had value without regard to her ve-
racity, if by veracity one means her general propensity to
describe events accurately. Even if the girl was a chronic liar
and had poor memory, perception, and narrative ability, her
ability to describe the apartment made it more likely that she
had been there. However, every hearsay declaration that is rel-
evant to a fact in issue has some value without regard to the
declarant's propensity to be accurate. For example, the ability
of Whittaker Chambers to describe the interior of Alger Hiss's
home made it more likely that Chambers had been there,
whether or not Chambers was (as the defense claimed) a psy-
chopathic liar.48 Nevertheless, one doubts that the government
would have been permitted to prove its case against Hiss with
out-of-court utterances by Chambers about Hiss's house.
If utterances are nonhearsay whenever they have any
value regardless of the declarant's character for veracity, then
the hearsay rule is a curiosity of no current significance. If ut-
terances are nonhearsay when their value would not be dimin-
ished very much by negative information about the declarant's
veracity, then the hearsay rule poses no obstacle to reliable ut-
terances even if they do not fit within an established exception;
and the failure of the reformers to achieve codification of this
47. McCoacic, supra note 1, § 249, at 592. The first edition used slightly
different language, stating that the testimony "has value apart from her verac-
ity." FIRST EDITION, supra note 3, § 228, at 467. The book also asserts that "the
undisputed proof excluded the possibility of other means by which she could
have acquired the knowledge, and thus the hearsay dangers were eliminated."
McCoRIcK, supra note 1, § 249, at 592; accord, FIRST EDITION, supra note 3,
§ 228, at 467. The defendant, however, did not stipulate that the only way the
girl could have obtained the knowledge of the contents of the apartment was by
being there on the day of the crime, and the mere failure of the defendant to
discover and offer testimony providing an alternative explanation does not
eliminate the possibility that such an explanation existed. See the possible ex-
planations described in note 50 in/ra.
48. On the testimony by Chambers describing Hiss's home, see N.Y.
Times, Nov. 22, 1949, at 2, coL 4. On the defense contention that Chambers was
a psychopathic liar, see New York University School of Law, 1950 Annual Sur-
vey of American Law 804-08 (1951); N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1950, at 1, col. 2, reprinted
in D. LoUISELL, J. KAPLAN, & J. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 512-
14 (3d ed. 1976).
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principle49 makes no difference, for both they and their oppo-
nents were working under a fundamental misconception. On
the other hand, if utterances offered for the truth of their asser-
tions are hearsay unless their value would not be diminished to
any degree by negative information about the declarant's verac-
ity, then the McCormick analysis of the Bridges case is plainly
wrong. The value of the girl's utterances would have been di-
minished by unfavorable information about her memory, per-
ception, sincerity, or narrative ability.50
By stating that the utterances did not depend for value on
the girl's credibility, McCormick ignores a sound basis for ad-
mitting her utterances under another theory and fails to dis-
49. On the failure of reformers to achieve codification of sweeping liberali-
zation of the hearsay rule, see the description of the fate of the Model Code
and the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence in McCoRmICK, supra note 1, §§ 326-
327, at 752-56; Maguire, The Hearsay System" Around and Through the Thicket,
14 VND. L REV. 741, 741-42 & n.1 (1961).
The original version of the Federal Rules of Evidence had a similar fate. As
promulgated by the Supreme Court, the Rules contained a broad exception for
utterances made soon after the matter was perceived by the declarant, while
his memory was clear, in good faith, and prior to the commencement of the ac-
tion. See PROPOSED FED. R. EviD. 804(b) (2), reprinted in FEDERAL RULEs OF
EVIDENCE FOR UNrrED STATES Cours AND MAGISTRATES 224 (West 1979). Con-
gress struck this entire provision. The rules enacted by Congress do contain
residual exceptions, see FED. . EviD. 803(24), 804(b) (5), but these exceptions
are far more restrictive than the broad reform proposed by the Model Code and
the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence. Under the current residual exceptions, the
testimony must not only have guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to
those of the standard exceptions; it also must be "More probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can pro-
cure through reasonable efforts," and notice of intent to offer it must be given
in advance of trial. See FED. R. EviD. 803 (24), 804(b) (5). The latter requirement
is particularly important because the proponent is likely to overlook it. Some
courts have responded by more or less ignoring the requirement of notice
before trial and have allowed admission when notice was given during trial and
the opponent was not prejudiced, but others have enforced the requirement as
written. See Yasser, supra note 34, at 595-97, 601-03.
50. In an out-of-court statement made prior to the discovery of defendant's
apartment, the girl said that the room to which she had been taken contained a
bed, a chest of drawers, a dresser, a table with a picture of a lady on it, and a
chair by the bed with a radio and alarm clock on it. Bridges v. State, 247 Wis.
350, 356, 19 N.W.2d 529, 531 (1945). She also described some of the exterior fea-
tures of the building and a nearby "doll house" (cottage). Id. at 350, 19 N.W.2d
at 531-32. The value of these utterances vary, if only slightly, with our assump-
tions about the veracity of the declarant. If we assume that the girl was a psy-
chopathic liar or was living in a world of fantasy, we would be more likely to
entertain the possibility that she fabricated or imagined a story about what she
saw and that the articles she described coincidentally matched those in the
apartment. Alternatively, she might have received a description of the apart-
ment from someone else who had visited there. These possibilities seem far-
fetched, but only because of assumptions that we entertain about the veracity
and motives of the declarant. See Morgan, The Law of Evidence 1941-45, 59
HARv. L. REV. 481, 544 (1946), cited in McCo Mmcx, supra note 1, § 249, at 592.
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cuss the facts that provide compelling reasons for admitting
them. The girl's description of the defendant's apartment was
sparse and somewhat inaccurate,5 1 but she made her statement
at a time when the events were fresh in her mind and when the
likelihood of adult influence was relatively small. What she
said soon after the crime was likely to be more accurate than
the testimony she gave at trial; memories fade and children are
susceptible to suggestion. Moreover, some of the safeguards
that are thought to make courtroom testimony reliable lose
their force when the witness is a child. The solemnity of the
proceedings, the religious and moral obligation to testify truth-
fully under oath, and the possibility of penalty for perjury
would not add value to her testimony. On the other hand, the
courtroom safeguards of cross-examination and observation
can be crucially important in assessing a child's testimony, and
in the actual Bridges case, the defendant had these protections
because the girl testified at trial.52
Thus the decision to admit the girl's prior utterances was a
wise one. The dictates of common sense undoubtedly led both
the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the authors of McCormick
to strain for a way to find the evidence admissible. The court
accomplished this by misusing the concept of circumstantial
evidence; McCormick justifies admissibility by bending the de-
clarant-oriented aspect of its hearsay definition. Neither of
these manipulations are necessary, however, because the evi-
dence could be admitted as the prior consistent statements of a
witness. It is true that the admission of prior consistent state-
ments is hedged with limitations5 3 because, in the absence of a
claim of recent fabrication or undue influence, their probative
51. Although the opinion does not describe with particularity how her
description differed from reality, it appears that there were some significant dif-
ferences. The court, in responding to the defendant's argument that the evi-
dence was not sufficient to support conviction, said somewhat apologetically
that the girl's testimony
does not appear to be so contradictory as to impair its credibility as a
matter of law. The statements made by her to her mother and police
officers ... were fairly accurate for a child of her age and limited
schooling and vocabulary, and her first description of the room and ar-
ticles therein was not too much out of line, although it was not distinc-
tive enough to be of much value either way.
Id. at 362, 19 N.W.2d at 534.
52. See id. at 355, 19 N.W.2d at 531. Under McCormick's analysis, her utter-
ances would be admissible even if she did not testify at trial. See McCoRMICK,
s-upra note 1, § 249, at 592.
53. See McComcK , supra note 1, § 49, at 105-07; 3 J. WEIsTEIN & M. BER-
GER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 607[08] (1975); 4 id. 1 801(d) (1) (B) [01]; 4 J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 4, §§ 1122-1144.
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value is normally outweighed by the dangers of waste of time
and confusion. Evidence that a witness made consistent state-
ments opens up the collateral issue of whether the utterances
were in fact made without really adding much to his or her
courtroom testimony. When the prior consistent statements
have substantial probative value, however, courts seldom hesi-
tate to admit them. For example, evidence that a rape victim
reported the criminal act soon after its occurrence has been ad-
mitted, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court amply said in a case
predating Bridges, "from the beginning of the history of the ad-
ministration of criminal law,"54 on grounds that without the evi-
dence the trier might be unfairly skeptical about the victim's
courtroom testimony. Citing this precedent, the Bridges court
summarily rejected the defendant's argument that the child's
out-of-court utterances describing his alleged sexual acts were
inadmissible.5 5 Her utterances describing his apartment
should have been admitted under the same principle. Without
such evidence, the jury might have viewed the girl's testimony
describing the apartment with skepticism, especially if she de-
scribed it in detail. The jury would be well aware that her in-
court testimony might be tainted by adult influence.56
Thus far this Article has focused on instances in which Mc-
Cormick escapes the hearsay ban by saying that utterances are
being used "circumstantially" or that they do not depend for
value on the credibility of the declarant. Instances in which the
book deems utterances nonhearsay because they are "verbal
acts" or "verbal parts of acts" will now be considered. McCor-
mick does not expressly define these two concepts or explain
the relationship between them and the book's more general
definition of hearsay. For that matter, McCormick does not ex-
pressly describe the difference between the two categories.
However, by examining the book's principal examples of the
two types of utterances, the reader can infer that "verbal acts"
are utterances "to which the law attaches duties and liabili-
54. Hannon v. State, 70 Wis. 448, 450-53, 36 N.W. 1, 2-3 (1888), cited in
Bridges v. State, 247 Wis. at 363, 19 N.W.2d at 534; accord, 4 J. WiGMORE, supra
note 4, §§ 1134-1139.
55. Bridges v. State, 247 Wis. at 363, 19 N.W.2d at 534-35.
56. The danger was especially great in Bridges because the police took the
girl to the defendant's apartment after his arrest. See 247 Wis. at 358, 19 N.W.2d
at 532. Even if her courtroom testimony had not been susceptible to attack on
grounds that she had been taken to the apartment so that she could identify it,
however, her prior utterances should still have been held admissible to rebut
suspicion that her courtroom testimony had been shaped by adults.
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ties" 57 without the need for accompanying nonverbal conduct,
while "verbal parts of acts" are utterances that help explain the
significance of contemporaneous nonverbal conduct. McCor-
mick's examples of "verbal acts" include words of offer and ac-
ceptance in contract and utterances offered to show slander or
deceit by the declarant; the book's examples of "verbal parts of
acts" include words accompanying the transfer of money that
designate the transaction as loan, payment, debt, bribe, or
gift.5 8
The general definition of hearsay in McCormick explains
the nonhearsay status of some of these utterances, but not that
of others. The examples involving slander and deceit are easy
to reconcile with the general definition because the utterances
are clearly not offered for the truth of their assertions. Indeed,
a proponent would lose on the overall claim if the trier believed
the utterances to be true. The example of offer and acceptance
in contract is somewhat more difficult to reconcile with the ba-
sic hearsay definition presented in McCormick. Common sense
suggests that "I accept your offer" must be admissible, but the
assertion-oriented aspect of the definition would suggest a dif-
ferent result; after all, the utterance states the exact proposi-
tion that it is offered to prove. There are various ways to
respond to this concern.5 9 The simplest response is that when
an utterance can be used without any reliance on the declar-
ant's credibility,60 one need not worry about whether it is of-
fered for the truth of its assertion. In other words, an utterance
that is not hearsay under the declarant-oriented definition is
not hearsay even in jurisdictions that purportedly follow an as-
sertion-oriented definition.
57. McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 249, at 588.
58. Id. at 588-89.
59. See, e.g., E. KMBAT.L, supra note 2, at 273 (1978) (words constituting ac-
ceptance of a contract offer "themselves have operative effect" and "are not of-
fered for their 'truth,' because they cannot be false") (emphasis omitted); G.
LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 160 (1978) ("I accept your of-
fer" is not hearsay because the "proponent only need establish that the opera-
tive words which formed the contract were spoken, not that these words were,
in any sense, true"); Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admis-
sible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 331 (1922) (an utterance accepting a con-
tract offer is an operative fact that "is offered, not for the purpose of proving its
truth, but merely for the purpose of showing that it was made"). See also 6 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1772, at 267.
60. For purposes of this example, it is assumed that the jurisdiction fol-
lows a completely objective test for contract formation, so that insincerity or
misnarration would not affect the creation of the contract. If the jurisdiction
followed a subjective test, the analysis for contracts would be the same as that
for bribes and gifts. See text accompanying notes 61-63 infra.
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This answer works for "I accept your offer," but it does not
work for some of the McCormick examples of words accompa-
nying the transfer of money. Suppose that the declarant char-
acterizes the transfer as a bribe and his or her words are
offered to show that the declarant committed a crime. The ut-
terance should be admitted, even if it is not the admission of a
party, but why is it admitted as a nonhearsay verbal part of an
act as opposed to being admitted, for example, under the state
of mind exception?61 When the utterance "I offer you a bribe"
or its equivalent is used to show that the declarant offered a
bribe, then the statement both states the proposition to be
proved and rests for value on the declarant's credibility. It
rests on credibility because one element of the crime of bribery
is subjective criminal intent.62 If the declarant was insincere
(for example, if he or she were offering a sham bribe as part of
an investigation), or defective in narration, then the utterance
does not establish the point for which it is offered. The same
analysis applies to the utterance 'T£his is a bet" offered to show
that the declarant was guilty of illegal gambling. Even words
characterizing a transfer as a loan, payment, or gift may rest on
the declarant's credibility.63
Admittedly, the principal examples of verbal parts of acts
in McCormick are utterances whose nonhearsay status is sup-
ported by ample legal precedent.6 4 The theoretical difficulty of
61. See McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, §§ 294-296, at 694-704; FmsT EDIoN,
supra note 3, §§ 268-271, at 567-78.
62. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976) (federal bribery statute).
63. In a jurisdiction in which the making of a gift requires subjective dona-
tive intent, a transfer of money accompanied by 'This is a gift" would not be
legally effective if the declarant misstated his or her intent. For a case in which
an apparently unambigous outward manifestation was overcome by evidence of
contrary subjective intent, see Kakanskis v. Jasut (Estate of Skucas), 169 Conn.
29, 362 A.2d 898 (1975). In Kakanskis, the putative donor delivered two
bankbooks and a bank statement to the putative donee, stating that the donee
was to have the money in the three bank accounts as a gift. The court sus-
tained the trial judge's determination that the donor had made a valid gift of
only two accounts on the ground that the donor's subsequent use of the third
account for his own purposes was sufficient evidence that he did not really in-
tend to transfer that account. Id. at 36, 362 A.2d at 903. Cases in which gifts
have been voided for mistake also illustrate that outward manifestations of in-
tent are not always controlling. See Ellis v. Drake, 206 Ala. 145, 89 So. 388 (1921)
(overruling demurrer to complaint seeking rescission on the ground that father
executed deed to his daughter under a mistaken impression as to its effect);
Twyford v. Huffaker, 324 S.W.2d 403 (Ky. 1959) (gift voided because of unilat-
eral mistake by donors as to amount of property transferred by deed); White v.
White, 346 Mass. 76, 190 N.E.2d 102 (1963) (transfer by mother to her son and
herself as 'Joint tenants" voided because of parties' mistake about legal effect
of joint tenancy).
64. See 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1777, and authorities cited therein.
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reconciling this result with hearsay definitions has usually
gone unrecognized, 65 perhaps because common sense so
strongly supports their admission. However, some of the sec-
ondary examples in McCormick rest on shakier grounds. For
example, the book asserts that a "mortgagor's statements that
he wanted [his] property 'plastered' so that his estranged wife
could not 'get her hooks into it' "66 is, when used to attack the
validity of the mortgage, a nonhearsay verbal part of an act.
Because such an utterance has no independent legal signifi-
cance 67 and would be used only to show intent, the utterance
65. A notable exception to the tendency to disregard hearsay dangers in
this kind of case appears in Lempert & Saltzburg's case book. With respect to
an example in which the declarant hands his friend $20 and says "take this as a
loan," Lempert and Saltzburg maintain that
the evidence appears relevant because it negates donative intent. This
inference about donative intent seems to require the jury to reason
from the making of the statement to the donor's belief about the trans-
action and from this belief to the fact in issue.... Most courts, how-
ever, do not engage in such fine analysis. They treat all clarifying
statements as part of the acts they accompany and assume the jury can
reason directly from them to facts in issue.
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 5, at 342-43.
Lempert and Saltzburg solve this problem of hearsay classification by cre-
ating a definition of hearsay under which an utterance is hearsay if the trier's
use of it requires reliance on the declarant's memory and perception but is not
hearsay if the trier's use requires reliance only on sincerity and narrative abil-
ity. Id. at 333-46. Although this modified declarant-oriented definition guides
readers to the correct result in cases involving statements about donative in-
tent, it is not consistent with well-established precedent in other areas. For ex-
ample, it is inconsistent with classification of direct utterances of state of mind
as hearsay (e.g., "I don't love you any more" offered to show what it asserts).
The authors argue that "[a]nalytically" such utterances are nonhearsay, but
warn readers that
[f] or the purpose of dealing with the problems in this book or examina-
tion questions we make the suggestion that you arbitrarily classify
statements offered to prove precisely the state of mind asserted as
hearsay. We do this because it accords with the view of most commen-
tators and because most courts if faced with a hearsay objection to
such a statement will more easily follow the claim that the statement
comes within the state of mind exception than they will a sophisticated
argument as to why the statement is not hearsay.
Id. at 346 (footnote omitted).
The Lempert and Saltzburg definition, like the more conventional declar-
ant-oriented definition, see Tribe, supra note 5, at 958-61, also fails to explain
why some utterances that involve all four hearsay dangers nevertheless are
commonly classified as nonhearsay. See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra
(utterances offered as falsehoods); text accompanying notes 69-72 infra (inter-
cepted calls to bookmakers). See also 1 WiGMORE, 1940 EDrrioN, supra note 17,
§§ 148-157 (name tags, labels, etc. are not hearsay when offered to show owner-
ship of the article labeled).
66. McComtci, supra note 1, § 249, at 589 & n.80 (citing Barnett v. Hitch-
ing Post Lodge, Inc., 101 Ariz. 488, 490, 421 P.2d 507, 509 (1966)).
67. In Barnett, the decedent attempted to put property beyond his wife's
reach by setting up a sham mortgage with the understanding that the mortga-
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rests for its value on the declarants' credibility. Moreover, Mc-
Cormick itself later treats as hearsay declarations offered to
show intent to defraud creditors. 68
In another questionable passage, McCormick asserts that
"statements made in connection with activities taking place on
the premises" are "verbal parts of acts" when used to show the
"character of an establishment," and it offers as an example ut-
terances that are "indicative of gambling," including telephone
calls intercepted by police while raiding a bookmaker. 69 Al-
though there are good reasons why testimony about these calls
should be admitted,70 and a respectable argument can be made
that they are not hearsay under the assertion-oriented defini-
tion,7 1 it is difficult to understand why they are "verbal parts of
gee would never foreclose. When the mortgagee sought to foreclose after the
decedent's death, the court admitted testimony that the decedent had told a
third party that he wanted the property "plastered" so that his estranged wife
could not "get her hooks into it." The utterance was not made at the time of
execution and was relevant only for the inference that the declarant intended
the subsequently executed mortgage to be a sham. Indeed, the Barnett court
correctly treated the utterance as evidence falling under the state of mind ex-
ception, instead of classifying it, as is done in McCormick, as a nonhearsay
"verbal part of an act." See 101 Ariz. at 490, 421 P.2d at 509; McCoRMcn, supra
note 1, § 249, at 589 & n.80.
68. In McCormick, utterances offered to show intent to defraud creditors
are listed among the examples of hearsay utterances admissible under the
state of mind exception. See McCoRmc, supra note 1, § 294, at 695; FIRST EDI-
TIoN, supra note 3, § 269, at 568-69. The inconsistency may have resulted be-
cause the revisors inserted the mortgage case into their new "verbal part of an
act" category without changing the first edition's classification of declarations
showing intent to defraud creditors. Wigmore classifies the fraudulent declara-
tions as nonhearsay verbal acts. See 6 J. WiGMORE, supra note 4, § 1783, at 309.
69. See McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 249, at 589 & n.81.
70. In the bookmaker cases, the evidence usually takes the form of testi-
mony that while on the premises police answered calls from unidentified per-
sons who attempted to place bets. The calls are usually reliable evidence
because they are corroborated by each other and by evidence found on the
premises (racing newspapers, multiple telephone lines, or bookmaking
paraphenalia). Also, unless bizarre facts are assumed, the callers would have
no motive to falsify.
71. In a typical case, the callers made utterances such as 'Tis is AL, Char-
lie; the Doc wants a $10.00 number hitch on eight races at Saratoga." State v.
Tolisano, 136 Conn. 210, 214, 70 A.2d 118, 119 (1949), cited in McComnc, supra
note 1, § 249, at 589 n.81. Under an assertion-oriented definition, one can make
an argument that the utterance is circumstantial evidence that the person for
whom the call was intended was a gambler, i.e., that the statement is not of-
fered for the truth of any assertion contained therein. See 6 J. WiGMORE, supra
note 4, § 1790, at 325 n.2. On the other hand, one might argue that the utterance
is equivalent to saying "I want to place a bet" and that the trier must accept the
truth of this assertion in order to reach the conclusion that the person the
caller thought he was talking to was a bookmaker. However, a plausible argu-
ment can be made that even if the caller did not truly want to make a bet (for
example, if he was in the habit of making prank calls) the utterance still has
some probative value on whether the person for whom the call was intended
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acts." One reason that this classification is puzzling is that, un-
like McCormick's examples of words characterizing the trans-
fer of money, the bookmaker calls do not seem to be "part" of
an independently relevant "act." More importantly, the calls do
not seem at all comparable to McCormick's principal examples
of utterances that fall within the book's two "verbal act" catego-
ries. When "I accept your offer" is used to show acceptance, or
"This is a gift" is used to establish that a contemporaneous
transfer was a gift, legally operative language is being used to
show the existence of the legal relationship it creates. By con-
trast, even if one assumes that attempted betting is a crime and
hence that the bookmaker calls were legally operative,72 the ut-
terances were not being used for what they did (subjected the
declarant to criminal liability) but to show what they expressly
or implicitly said (that the intended addressee was a boolde);
when used in this fashion, operative language is not necessarily
admissible.73 As for the general category of statements "made
in connection with activities on the premises" used to show
"the character of an establishment," the basis for deeming
was a bookmaker. It should be noted that this is another instance in which the
difference between the assertion-orientated definition of hearsay and the de-
clarant-oriented definition can make a difference. Under the declarant-oriented
definition, the calls would be hearsay because they depend for value on the de-
clarants' credibility. The credibility dangers are reduced, but not eliminated,
by the corroborating evidence described in note 70 supra.
72. The term "legally operative" is being used loosely here, in the manner
of those who classify words of bet, bribe, or gift as "legally operative," so that
the term includes not only utterances that have operative effect regardless of
the declarant's subjective mental state, but also words that have operative ef-
fect only if uttered in conjunction with a specified subjective intent. In this in-
stance, the subjective intent required would be intent to place a bet.
73. When legally operative language is offered for something other than
what it "does" (that is, for something other than showing the existence of the
legal relationship that it creates), the language does not escape from the hear-
say rule simply because it is legally operative. For example, allegations in
pleadings are legally operative language; they define the controversy, limit
proof, and provide the predicate for the next step in pleading. No one, however,
would assert that pleadings are nonhearsay when offered for what they say in-
stead of for what they do. Pleadings would be patently unreliable when used
for that purpose. If the pleadings of plaintiff and defendant survive a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, then some of the facts alleged in the complaint
or answer must be false. The doctrinal treatment of the judgment of prior con-
viction is another example; if a conviction was considered a nonhearsay "verbal
act" when offered to show the belief it reflected, as opposed to the legal effect
that it had, then there would be no need for the limited hearsay exception ad-
dressed to the use of prior convictions. See FED. R. EvID. 803(22). This is also
the case with recitals in wills, contracts, and the like: when offered to show the
legal relationship they create, they are not hearsay; when offered to show the
truth of other assertions contained in them, they are hearsay unless they fall
under an exception or exclusion.
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these utterances nonhearsay is unexplained in McCormick and
seems unjustifiable. The category is broad enough to include
conversation between customers in a tavern about prostitution
on the premises, or gossip among guests at a party about the
host's cache of drugs. Admission of this evidence in a prosecu-
tion of the tavern owner or the host would involve both use of
utterances to show the truth of their assertions and reliance on
the declarant's credibility.
Recognition that utterances made about the character of an
establishment are hearsay would not thwart justice. If the ut-
terances were addressed to the defendant, the adoptive admis-
sion theory would normally provide an escape from the hearsay
rule;74 if the utterances described activities that the declarants
were then observing, the present sense impression exception
could be employed in jurisdictions taking a modern view of the
exception's scope.75 There is no need to strain for a way to
classify statements about the character of an establishment as
"verbal parts of acts;" if such utterances are reliable, they will
be admitted into evidence by another route.
The "verbal acts" and "verbal parts of acts" categories were
added by the revisors of the second edition of McCormick. In
the first edition Dean McCormick employed the more manage-
able concept of "utterances proved as operative facts" and of-
fered a reduced list of examples.7 6 This concept of "operative"
language explains the examples involving slander, deceit, and
contracts very well. If glossed to include not only language that
has operative effect by itself but also language that has opera-
tive effect when uttered with a specified intent, the concept
would also identify utterances characterizing transfers of
money as nonhearsay.
The revisors' change to "verbal acts" and "verbal parts of
acts" is not an improvement. These terms may help readers a
bit by hinting that utterances are admissible when offered for
what they do instead of what they say,7 7 but the benefit of this
hint is outweighed by the resulting confusion about the limits
of these catagories, which show signs of becoming a modern
74. See generally McCoxmcx, supra note 1, §§ 269-270.
75. See FED. R. EvD. 803(1); McCoRmcx, supra note 1, § 298.
76. FIRsT EDrIoN, supra note 3, § 228, at 463-84.
77. Cf J.L. AusTIN, PHiLosoPHicAL PAPERS 235-36 (2d ed. 1970). Austin dis-
cusses what he calls "performative utterances," providing as examples "I do
[take this woman as my wife]," "I apologize," and "I name this ship the Queen
Elizabeth." These utterances, he says, "couldn't possibly be true or false," and
"if a person makes an utterance of this sort we should say that he is doing
something rather than merely saying something." Id. at 235.
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substitute for res gestae.78 A computer-aided search indicates
that recent cases containing, in conjunction, the words "hear-
say" and "verbal act(s)" or "verbal part(s) of act(s)" are not
concerned with language creating contracts, gifts, or the like.79
Apparently the absurdity of excluding such utterances is so ob-
vious that there has been no occasion for appellate courts to
write opinions explaining that statements of this kind are ad-
missible. Instead, the terms have been applied repeatedly to
language that is not legally operative, but merely explains the
declarant's contemporaneous nonverbal conduct. Many of the
utterances in these cases asserted the proposition to be proved,
rested for value on the declarant's credibility, and did not fit
under any established hearsay exception.80 Since almost any
utterance helps to explain conduct, the "verbal act" categories
provide a discretionary hearsay escape that can be invoked
without the necessity of explaining why the evidence is trust-
78. For a general discussion of res gestae, see McComucK, supra note 1,
§ 288; FIRST EDITION, supra note 3, § 274.
79. This search was performed on the LEXIS federal case library. The
search request asked for retrieval of all cases in which the words "verbal
act(s)" or "verbal part(s) of act(s)" appeared within 20 words of the word
"hearsay." For a discussion of some of the cases that resulted from this search,
see note 80 infra and accompanying text.
80. For example, in a case where B's statement that he was going to meet
with his suppliers for purposes of obtaining heroin was admitted against A to
show that A was one of the suppliers, the Second Circuit held that the state-
ment was a "verbal act," defined "verbal acts" as "contemporaneous utterances
explaining nonverbal conduct or its tenor," and let in the utterance on the ap-
parent ground that it "explain[ed]" both B's conduct in getting into a car with
A and A's conduct in taking evasive action when surveillance was detected.
See United States v. D'Amato, 493 F.2d 359, 363-65 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 419
U.S. 826 (1974). See also United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1049-50 n.4 (5th
Cir.) (utterance by unidentified declarant who gave J heroin that P would meet
her to pick up heroin was admissible against P as an utterance "contemporane-
ous with a nonverbal act, independently admissible, relating to that act and
throwing some light on it"), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); United States v.
Wiley, 519 F.2d 1348, 1350 (2d Cir. 1975) (alternative holding); United States v.
Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 376-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961). But
see Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956, 959-60 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
A different panel of the Second Circuit used the "verbal act" concept to
permit admission against Y of an utterance by X saying that Y was going to
give X a kilo of heroin. See United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1109 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975); cf. United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588,
596 (2d Cir.) (utterance indicating that uncle was source of heroin admissible
against uncle because it "shed light" on declarant's conduct during clandestine
visit to uncle), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1973).
The Fifth Circuit has invoked "verbal act" to let in A's threat that third par-
ties would harm the addressee in a case in which the utterance was offered
against the third parties to show that they were part of an extortion scheme.
United States v. Burke, 495 F.2d 1226, 1231-32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1079 (1974).
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worthy or meeting the other requirements of the residual hear-
say exceptions.
H.
The remainder of this Article is addressed to law teachers
who plan to use McCormick as a primary text in courses on evi-
dence. Proper emphasis on the limitations of the book's analy-
sis of hearsay can prevent students from being misled and can
promote critical thought. In an effort to be specific, I will pres-
ent a lesson plan that could be followed when McCormick is
used as a casebook substitute.
I would first assign the definitions of hearsay in McCor-
mick8S and in the Federal Rules of Evidence,82 and the portions
of McCormick on utterances that are not hearsay because they
are offered to show their effect on the hearer or reader.83 This
assignment would give students an opportunity to apply the
McCormick definition of hearsay to situations in which it pro-
vides useful guidance. For example, the assertion-oriented def-
inition in McCormick would guide a student to the conclusion
that an utterance such as "I am going to kill you" is not hearsay
when offered to show that the person being addressed had rea-
son to fear the declarant.
Students do sometimes have difficulty when an utterance
offered to show its effect upon the hearer or reader also asserts
a proposition that the proponent must prove independently in
order to prevail on the overall claim. For example, an utterance
warning a physician that his or her patient is allergic to penicil-
lin is hearsay if used to show the existence of the allergy, but
not hearsay if used to show that the doctor had notice of the
allergy. If both issues are in dispute and no hearsay exception
is applicable, then the utterance should be admitted with in-
structions limiting its use to the second purpose.84 When an ut-
terance has this sort of double relevancy, students sometimes
have trouble understanding how it can be admitted for any pur-
81. McCoRaICK, supra note 1, § 246. My initial assignment would also in-
clude McCormick's discussion of the history and purpose of the hearsay rule.
See id. §§ 244-245.
82. FED. R. EvD. 801(a)-(c). Rule 801(c) is a typical assertion-oriented def-
inition: an utterance is hearsay when "offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted." Rule 801(d) provides that certain prior statements of wit-
nesses and admissions of parties are not hearsay even when offered for their
truth. I would delay coverage of Rule 801(d) until after the assignments de-
scribed in text accompanying notes 81-114 infra.
83. See FED. R. EviD. 105; McCoRMIcx, supra note 1, § 249, at 589-90.
84. McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 59, at 135-36.
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pose. If the utterance is not true, then the proponent's case
fails;8 5 hence, how can one say that an utterance is relevant
without regard to the truth of its assertion? There are no doubt
many satisfactory answers to this question, but I prefer simply
to tell students that when an utterance can be used for a pur-
pose that does not require reliance on the credibility of the de-
clarant, they need not be concerned with whether the
truthfulness of what it asserts is an essential element of the
proponent's case. When used to show notice, the declarant's
credibility is irrelevant; the circumstance that the proposition
asserted in the utterance must be established by other evi-
dence does not prevent it from being admitted on the issue of
notice.
To help students distinguish utterances that rest on the de-
clarant's credibility from those that do not, I would use Tribe's
ingenious triangle as an illustrative aid.86 (Students should be
warned, however, that when analysis with the triangle shows
reliance on credibility the utterance might nevertheless be
deemed nonhearsay under the assertion-oriented definition;
Tribe's declarant-oriented definition of hearsay is not consis-
tent with majority doctrine.) 87 Using the triangle, students
could be asked whether the girl's statement in Bridges88 and
the utterance "I know the brakes are bad"89 can, as McCormick
asserts,90 be used without reliance on the declarant's veracity.
My next topic would be utterances used as direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence of the declarant's state of mind. As a pre-
85. I am assuming that the existence of the allergy is an essential element
of plaintiffs case.
86. See Tribe, supra note 5, at 958-61.
87. Tribe's definition is inconsistent with the many cases that state that
circumstantial evidence of the declarant's state of mind is nonhearsay. See Mc-
Comanc, supra note 1, § 249, at 590-96; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1790; text
accompanying notes 25-32 supra. Tribe's definition is also inconsistent with the
judicial tendency to designate utterances that explain certain types of conduct
(such as the transfer of money) as nonhearsay "verbal acts" even when the le-
gal effect of the conduct varies with the subjective state of mind of the actor.
See text accompanying notes 57-80 supra. The Federal Rules of Evidence re-
flect this tendency by adopting an assertion-oriented definition, thereby en-
couraging use of the concept of circumstantial evidence, and by mentioning the
concept of "verbal act" approvingly in the Advisory Committe's Note. See FED.
R. EvlD. 801(a)-(c) & Advisory Comm. Note. The Federal Rules also differ with
Tribe as to the proper classification of admissions and of nonverbal conduct,
but there is no need to warn students about this because the difference is am-
ply set forth by Tribe himself. See Tribe, supra note 5, at 973.
88. See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
89. McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 249, at 592; FIRST EDrrION, .supra note 3,
§ 228, at 466; see text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
90. McCoRImK, supra note 1, § 249, at 592.
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liminary matter, I would assign McCormick's definition of
circumstantial evidence9 l so that students could realize that to
say an assertion is not offered for its truth because it is being
used circumstantially is to reason in circles. The class should
be cautioned about McCormick's question-begging use of the
term "circumstantial" as an escape from hearsay.92 The main
focus of discussion, however, should be on the utility of the dis-
tinction between circumstantial and direct use of utterances.
As preparation for this discussion, students should read
the portions of McCormick 93 and the Federal Rules94 that deal
with the use of utterances for inferences about the declarant's
state of mind. This assignment would include readings on the
hearsay exception for declarations of then-existing state of
mind,9 5 and hence would be a break with tradition because it
introduces a hearsay exception prior to finishing the distinction
between hearsay and nonhearsay. My rationale for the breach
is that the same considerations of necessity and reliability sup-
port the admission of such utterances, whether they are offered
directly to show present state of mind or indirectly for the
same purpose. The utterances are necessary evidence because
it is difficult and foolish to try to prove a declarant's state of
mind without using his or her utterances. They are relatively
reliable because the hearsay dangers of bad memory and mis-
perception are insignificant when an utterance is offered to
show the declarant's then-existing mental state. For example,
when an utterance is offered for the inference that the declar-
ant disliked Jim, the direct use of "I dislike Jim" and the indi-
rect use of "Jim ought to be shot" are both subject to the
dangers of insincerity and misnarration, but the dangers of de-
fective memory and perception are virtually absent.9 6
91. Id. § 185, at 435-36.
92. See id. § 249, at 592; FmrsT EDITION, supra note 3, § 228, at 466.
93. McCoRMIC, supra note 1, §§ 249, 289, 294-296, at 590-95, 687-88, 694-704.
94. FED. R. EvIn. 801(a)-(c), 803(3).
95. FED. P, Evm. 803(3); McComcir, supra note 1, § 294.
96. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 5, at 964-65. There are, however, some con-
ceivable dangers of faulty memory or perception. For example, a declarant who
said "I dislike Jim" might be mistaken about the identity of Jim. The mistake
could be due either to bad memory or to misperception at the time Jim was in-
troduced. The declarant might really mean that he or she dislikes Tom, whom
he or she has confused with Jim. Normally, however, utterances used solely to
show present state of mind do not rely heavily on memory or external percep-
tion.
McCormick's rationale for the state of mind exception is that the utter-
ances are likely to be reliable because of "their spontaneity and probable
sincerity." McCoMwICK, supra note 1, § 294, at 695. Maintaining that the utter-
ances are reliable because they do not rest substantially on memory and per-
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Early assignment of the state of mind exception will also
help students realize that when an utterance is offered to show
then-existing state of mind, the distinction between circum-
stantial and direct use makes no difference because of the
availability of a hearsay exception. Students should be aware
that whether an utterance such as "I believe that I am Henry
the Eighth" is hearsay is an academic question when the evi-
dence is used to show insanity.97
Clever distinctions on which nothing turns are not much
help in predicting what courts will do when calling an utter-
ance hearsay would cause it to be excluded. For this reason, I
would use examples in which classification as hearsay could re-
sult in exclusion, and would ask students whether it makes
sense to treat utterances used circumstantially differently from
those used directly. A good starting place would be utterances
offered as falsehoods. Suppose that a declarant attempted to
set up a false alibi for a friend accused of a crime. The prosecu-
tion can demonstrate the falsity of the alibi, and offers the de-
clarant's story as evidence of the friend's guilt. Direct use of
"he's guilty" would be impermissible, but circumstantial use of
the falsehood "he couldn't be guilty because he was here with
me" would be permissible under the assertion-oriented defini-
tion.9 8 Additional examples from W?ight v. Tatham9 9 could also
be discussed. The issue in Wright v. Tatham was the compe-
tence of a testator to make a will. The beneficiary of the will
offered in evidence letters that had been written to the testator.
The letters were written as if the authors were addressing a
person of ordinary understanding, and they were offered to
show that the writers believed that the testator was competent,
as the basis for the further inference that the testator was in
fact competent. To draw these inferences the trier would not
be required to rely upon the truth of assertions in the letters,
but a good argument can be made that an utterance directly as-
serting that the testator was competent would be better evi-
dence than indirect use of the letters. 0 0
ception seems preferable for a jurisdiction following a modern view of the
scope of the exception. For example, the exception in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence has no requirement that the utterance be spontaneous or that a motive
for fabrication be absent. See FED. R. Evin. 803(3).
97. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
98. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
99. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (1837) (first appeal); 47 Rev. Rep. 136 (H.L 1838) (sec-
ond appeal), discussed in McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 250, at 597-98.
100. One of the letters to the testator in Wright was from the local vicar,
who advised the testator to have his lawyer do something about a pending dis-
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At this point, the hearsay status of nonverbal conduct
could also be discussed. The use of nonassertive nonverbal
conduct to evidence the actor's belief raises many of the same
issues as the circumstantial use of verbal assertions. There is a
similar danger that the trier will draw an incorrect inference
about the actor's beliefs,O1 or that a correct inference about
these beliefs will lead to an erroneous conclusion because of
defects in the actor's memory and perception. On the other
hand, an actor's nonverbal conduct often suggests reliance by
the actor upon a certain belief, and in such cases the actor may
have exercised special care in ascertaining the foundation for
his or her belief.102 Moreover, since lawyers seldom recognize
that nonassertive nonverbal conduct raises hearsay problems,
rules excluding evidence of such conduct would operate spo-
radically and unequally.103
After this discussion, I would ask students to read the por-
tions of McCormick that deal with verbal acts and verbal parts
of acts.10 4 My goal would be to acquaint students with this ter-
minology while suggesting to them the limited usefulness of
pute between the testator and the parish, "or disagreeable things must un-
avoidably happen" that would result in "much Trouble and Expence [sic] to
both Parties." 112 Eng. Rep. at 491. In using this letter, the trier of fact would
be required to assume that the vicar had adequate opportunity to observe the
testator, that he interpreted the testator's mental state correctly, and that he in
fact wrote as he did because of his belief that the testator was competent. It is
entirely possible that the vicar believed that the testator was incompetent, con-
sidered this problem in framing his letter, and decided that it would be conve-
nient and polite to write to the testator as if he were competent, knowing that
the letter would ultimately find its way to someone who could act on it. Sup-
pose that, instead, the proponent of the will had offered a letter from the vicar
to a friend asserting that the testator was sound, intelligent, and fully compe-
tent to act as a child's ward. In using this letter, the trier would still be re-
quired to rely on the vicar's credibility. However, some of the hearsay dangers
would be ameliorated. It would be clear that the vicar did intend to assert com-
petence and, moreover, the vicar would be putting his own reputation for verac-
ity on the line. The trier would be more justified in this case in assuming that
the vicar had an opportunity to observe the testator and that the vicar believed
he had a sufficient basis for judging competence. (I am indebted to my col-
league John J. Cound for this example.)
101. On this and related points, see the excellent discussion in Finman,
supra note 13.
102. In the famous example of the ship's captain who inspects-the vessel
and then sets sail on it with his family, the captain's reliance obviously sup-
ports admission of evidence about his actions to show that the ship appeared to
be seaworthy. In other instances, reliance may not be significant, but one could
argue that it is simpler to have a per se rule that does not require courts to dis-
tinguish between significant and insignificant reliance.
103. See McCoRmcK, supra note 1, § 250, at 599; Falknor, The "Hear-Say"
Rule as a "See-Do" Rule: Evidence of Conduct, 33 U. CoLo. L REV. (previously
RocKy MTN. L REV.) 133, 137 (1961).
104. McComcc, supra note 1, § 249, at 588-89.
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the concepts of "verbal acts" and "verbal parts of acts." These
concepts probably do more harm than good. Without any in-
struction in the law of evidence at all students would probably
surmise that utterances creating contracts, gifts, loans, and the
like must be admissible. Otherwise, it would be impossible to
vindicate the substantive rights they have learned about in
other courses such as contracts, torts, and property. All that
the course in evidence teaches is that such utterances are
nonhearsay, as opposed to being hearsay admissible under an
exception. Students will not need to know this in practice,
since admissibility does not turn upon it; nor does this bit of
knowledge illuminate anything else in the evidence course-
quite the contrary.105 Nonetheless, evidence teachers have long
insisted that students learn it for the examination, so students
set about doing so.
I suspect that students learn this nonhearsay category
largely by repetition of examples. The list is not long: con-
tracts, gifts, loans, words offered to show defamation or deceit,
bets, bribes, and other words characterizing a transfer of prop-
erty. The assertion-oriented definition is of no help in deciding
how to treat such utterances, and may even be harmful;106 the
utility of the declarant-oriented definition depends upon
whether the student has the misfortune of perceiving that some
of the utterances in this group require reliance on the declar-
ant's credibility.S0 7 Students are probably helped more by an
ability to see analogies between examples on the list than they
are by hearsay exceptions or by the concept of "verbal acts."
Admittedly, once students have learned the list, some of them
may find "verbal act" to be a handy label for its contents,
though perhaps an arbitrary word would be better, since both
hearsay students and hearsay experts are likely to attribute in-
dependent meaning to "verbal act" and place all sorts of utter-
ances that are not legally operative in this category.108
When dealing with McCormick's examples of "verbal acts"
105. The amorphous category of "verbal acts," like "res gestae" before it,
probably obfuscates more than it explains. See text accompanying notes 57-80
supra. Even if this phrase were discarded, thoughtful students would still be
puzzled by the nonhearsay status of certain utterances that both state the
proposition to be proved and rest for value on the declarant's credibility. See
text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
106. The assertion-oriented definition sometimes confuses students when
the utterance states the proposition to be proved, such as 'This is a binding
contract" or '"This is a gift." See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
108. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
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and "verbal parts of acts," I would remind students that they
need not worry about whether an utterance is offered for its
truth if the use of it will not require reliance on credibility;
hence, in a jurisdiction following an objective theory of con-
tracts, "I want to buy 500 widgets" and "This is a contract" re-
ceive similar treatment. I would then ask whether
McCormick's examples require reliance on credibility. At some
point in the continuum from contract to gift to bribe to declara-
tions of intent to defraud creditors,109 I would expect students
to say that hearsay dangers are involved in the trier's use of
the utterance. For example, use of "This is a bribe" to show
that the declarant committed bribery requires reliance on his
or her sincerity and narrative ability,"n0 and hence two (but
only two) hearsay dangers are present. These two dangers are
also encountered when an utterance is offered as direct evi-
dence of present state of mind. Such utterances are, of course,
admissible under the modern version of the state of mind ex-
ception, which students would have studied in the earlier as-
signment. I would tell the class that utterances creating
contracts, gifts, loans, and the like should be considered admis-
sible either because such statements do not require reliance on
the declarant's credibility at all, or because they can be used to
show the declarant's then-existing state of mind, and hence
would be admissible under the state of mind exception. Fi-
nally, I would tell students that, so far as my course is con-
cerned, they need not try to sort the utterances into categories
labeled "nonhearsay" and "hearsay-but-admissible"; it is suffi-
cient that they know the utterances would be admissible either
as nonhearsay or as declarations of present state of mind.
After addressing utterances that accompany the transfer of
money, I would turn to utterances indicative of gambling. I
would probably distribute State v. Tolisano,"' one of the cases
cited in McCormick as involving a "verbal part of an act,""12 to
109. All of these utterances are listed as "verbal acts" or "verbal parts of
acts!' in McCormick. See McCoP.buci, supra note 1, § 249, at 588-89, 589 n.80.
110. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
111. 136 Conn. 210, 70 A.2d 118 (1949).
112. McConm¢cI, supra note 1, § 249, at 589 n.81. Tolisano dealt with the ad-
missibility of telephone calls answered by police while they were raiding the
apartment of a suspected bookmaker. The unidentified callers made utterances
such as 'This is Al, Charlie; the Doc wants a $10.00 number hitch on eight races
at Saratoga." 136 Conn. at 214, 70 A.2d at 119. All four hearsay dangers are at
least theoretically present when such utterances are used to show that the in-
tended addressee was guilty of illegal gambling. The caller might have a wrong
number, might be mistaken about the nature of the establishment because of
bad memory or perception, might be joking or deliberately attempting to in-
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demonstrate the hearsay dangers that accompany the use of
such utterances. I would introduce the residual exceptions in
the Federal Rules of Evidence1 3 as a possible alternative basis
for admission. Finally, I would present a case that used the
"verbal act" label to admit utterances of questionable reliabil-
ity 114 to illustrate how a concept such as "verbal act" can be-
come another res gestae.
In the foregoing pages, I have described both a lesson plan
and a set of objectives. The latter is clearly more important
than the former. There are many good arguments for using a
different sequence of assignments or for covering some matters
by lecture instead of dialogue.115 Whatever the lesson plan,
however, a teacher should seek to give students more guidance
than McCormick does about the relationship of assertion-ori-
ented and declarant-oriented definitions of hearsay, and about
the meaning and utility of hypnotic terms such as "circumstan-
tial evidence" and "verbal acts."
III. CONCLUSION
McCormick's discussion of certain nonhearsay categories is
confusing and misleading. The book classifies some utterances
as "circumstantial evidence" even when, applying its own defi-
nition of the difference between circumstantial and direct evi-
criminate the defendant, or might be trying imperfectly to convey something
other than intent to place a bet. Since the utterances require reliance on the
memory and belief of declarants, one cannot say that, if hearsay, they would
nevertheless be admissible under the exception for declarations of present
state of mind. I would expect students to see these hearsay dangers, but also
to argue that the utterances ought to be admitted. One theory of admission
that is superior to "verbal act" is that they are offered as circumstantial evi-
dence of state of mind. See note 71 supra.
113. FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b)(5). See note 34 supra.
114. See cases cited in note 80 supra.
115. For example, the possibility that close textual analysis of McCormick
will sharpen students' understanding of hearsay must be weighed against the
danger that these classes will be relatively dry in comparison with those that,
for example, use the stimulating problems in the booklet by K. Broun & P. Mei-
senholder, see note 2 supra. Although many of the points made in this Article
can be raised in class during discussion of the booklet's problems, see, e.g., K.
BROUN & R. MEmIsEHOLDER, supra note 2, Problem 12-L, at 96 (problem involv-
ing utterance offered as falsehood, similar to example described at text accom-
panying notes 10-11 supra; this problem could be used to show that an
utterance that is hearsay under a declarant-oriented definition can be nonhear-
say under an assertion-oriented definition); id. Problem 12-M, at 96 (problem
involving statements offered to show insanity; could be used as prelude to dis-
cussion of "I believe I am Henry the Eighth," see text accompanying notes 15-
24 supra), a decision to cover the points raised by dialogue (as opposed to lec-
ture or reading assignment) would necessarily involve a sacrifice of time that
could be devoted to discussion of other problems from the booklet.
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dence, they would be direct evidence. It asserts that other
utterances do not depend for value upon the declarant's "verac-
ity," even when the value of these utterances would be de-
creased by negative information about the declarant's memory,
perception, sincerity, or narrative ability. It applies the label
"verbal part of an act" to utterances that are not legally opera-
tive and that involve hearsay dangers, without explaining why
these utterances belong in the same category as legally opera-
tive language, or why the category itself falls outside the book's
assertion-oriented definition of hearsay. In general, McCor-
mick's treatment of the concept of hearsay is tainted by unex-
plained assertions and obscure generalities.
With one exception,"16 the perplexities in the treatment of
hearsay found in McCormick originated in Dean McCormick's
first edition. The obtuse quality of these sections on hearsay
can hardly be attributed to dullness of intellect. Dean McCor-
mick had the ability and diligence to provide clearer analysis,
but he may have had mixed feelings about undertaking this en-
deavor."17 As a supporter of radical change1 8 who was writing
116. The exception is the book's passages on "verbal acts" and "verbal parts
of acts," which were added by the revisors in place of the first edition's para-
graph entitled "Writings and utterances proved as operative acts." FIRsT EDI-
TION, supra note 3, § 288, at 463-64; see text accompanying notes 76-80 supra.
117. Dean McCormick's mixed feelings are suggested in his reluctant fare-
well to res gestae:
The writers and, less frequently, the courts have criticized the use
of the phrase, res gestae .... [However,] in the last century the pre-
ponderant need has been for the expansion of the scope of admissibil-
ity. Predominantly the use of the phrase res gestae has been as a
reason for admitting, not for excluding evidence. Manifestly, too, the
very vagueness of the term has been beneficial, as making it easier to
widen the application of the doctrine into new fields. Perhaps the time
has now come when this policy of widening admissibility will be even
better served by striving for a clearer analysis .... If so, we could
well jettison the ancient phrase, with due acknowledgement that it has
well served its era in the evolution of evidence law.
FIRST EDITION, supra note 3, § 274, at 587 (footnotes omitted). Dean McCor-
mick's attitude can also be inferred from his casual approval of the inference
from assertion to belief and back to the fact asserted in the instance of retro-
spec.tive declarations about wills. See text accompanying notes 25-31 supra. At
the time the first edition was published in 1954, Dean McCormick must have
known about Wignore's discussion of the same example and about his demon-
stration that use of this pretended double inference could lead to demolition of
the hearsay rule. See note 28 supra.
118. Throughout his treatment of hearsay, Dean McCormick consistently fa-
vored broader admissibility, and after writing approvingly about the radical re-
form proposed in the Model Code, he offered an even broader exception of his
own: hearsay should be admissible "if the judge finds that the need for and the
probative value of the statement render it a fair means of proof under the cir-
cumstances." FIRST EDITION, supra note 3, § 305, at 634. He predicted that "fur-
ther beyond the horizon" the rule against hearsay would "disappear," to be
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in the aftermath of the utter failure of the Model Code reform
effort," 9 he may have thought that tangles in hearsay doctrine
should be left undisturbed because they provided cover under
which reliable utterances could find their way into evidence. If
this was the case, Dean McCormick's goal was laudable, but a
straightforward discussion of why the utterances should be ad-
missible might have been a better way of achieving it.
Even with its faults, however, the current version of McCor-
mick can still be a useful casebook substitute for law school ev-
idence courses. The book's discussion of other topics is usually
clear and enlightening. Moreover, the passages in McCormick
that this Article has criticized can be used to advantage if
enough class time is allocated to analysis and discussion. Stu-
dents can be encouraged to examine critically the ideas in Mc-
Cormick and to develop their own notions about the concept of
hearsay. In doing so, they may realize that concepts like "ver-
bal act" and "circumstantial evidence" can be manipulated at a
judge's pleasure. Perhaps as lawyers they will come to favor
the proposals to simplify hearsay doctrine that have long been
advocated by scholars.
replaced by the practice "which ... prevails in the leading countries of Europe,
that is, the system of receiving hearsay and evaluating it." Id. (footnotes omit-
ted).
119. When the first edition of McCormick was published in 1954, not a single
jurisdiction had adopted the liberalizing hearsay provisions of the American
Law Institute's 1942 Model Code of Evidence. See FrsT EDITION, mpura note 3,
§ 304, at 632.
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